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Abstract 
 There are 32 teams in the National Football League all competing to be the best 
by creating the strongest roster possible. The problem of evaluating talent has created 
extreme competition between teams in the form of a rookie draft and a fiercely 
competitive veteran free agent market. The difficulty with player evaluation is due to the 
noise associated with measuring a particular player’s value. The intent of this paper is to 
create an algorithm for identifying the inefficiencies in pricing in these player markets. In 
particular, this paper focuses on the veteran free agent market for offensive linemen in 
the NFL. NFL offensive linemen are difficult to evaluate empirically because of the 
significant amount of noise present due to an inability to measure a lineman’s 
performance directly. The algorithm first uses a machine learning technique, k-means 
cluster analysis, to generate a comparative set of offensive lineman. Then using that set of 
comparable offensive linemen, the algorithm flags any lineman that vary significantly in 
earnings from their peers. It is in this fashion that the algorithm provides relative 
valuations for particular offensive lineman. 
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I. Introduction 
In this past 2016 season the NFL split at least $7.1 Billion in revenue between the 
32 teams, amounting to a staggering $222.6 million per team for only the national 
sponsorship, broadcasting, licensing, and merchandising deals.1 The NFL is truly big 
business with big contracts. Due to league rules however teams are limited in how much 
money they can dole out to the players. This past season, the salary cap for each of the 32 
NFL teams was set at $155,270,000.2 This restrictions make the market for veteran 
players, who are free to negotiate, very competitive.  
This free agent marketplace and the hype that surrounds it creates a massive 
spectacle every year from March all the way until the NFL season begins in September. 
During this time NFL teams work frantically to scout the incoming college players as 
well as the veteran players able to be signed away from their current teams after their 
previous contract expired. 
With the rise in popularity of statistics and economics applied to the world of 
sports and the competition between teams, general managers are looking for any edge 
they can get. Statistics in the football world have traditionally been only for position 
players with statistics like quarter back rating, yards per completion, etc. Offensive 
linemen have been historically difficult to get a handle on as their production cannot be 
measured directly, but always as a function of some other player’s performance. This 
makes them difficult to evaluate and value. 
																																								 																				
1 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-24/nfl-revenue-reaches-7-1-billion-
based-on-green-bay-report [1]  
2 https://www.nflpa.com/news/all-news/2016-adjusted-team-salary-caps [2]  
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The goal of my thesis is to develop an empirical method to value offensive 
lineman in the NFL and use that to conduct a comparative analysis of their relative 
salaries. There are no true output statistics specific to an offensive lineman’s 
performance. Every statistic that could be relevant is an empirical measure of someone 
else’s performance, like the RB or QB. While this argument of shared statistics could be 
made with the QB throwing to a great WR, ultimately there is always the confounding 
effects of a teammate on an individual player’s performance, the fact remains that there 
are no stats that even point to an offensive lineman’s performance.  
The only existing system for the evaluation of an offensive lineman’s 
performance is through Pro Football Focus’s grading system. They establish a rubric, 
they watch the play, then they assign a value between -2 and 2 to the play. Not 
necessarily the outcome of the play, but the performance of the specific offensive 
lineman. They then normalize these grades based on situation and then they convert it to 
a 0-100 scale as the final grade breakdown. This is interesting, though clearly has a lot of 
flaws. There are many different graders and the grade is not based on an empirical 
analysis of the offensive lineman but on a subjective analysis.  
I will attempt to take a page out of the corporate finance playbook and use 
comparables to measure the true value of a particular player. The theory being that if I 
can mathematically create a set of comparables to a particular offensive lineman then 
they should have similar salaries i.e. the average of the comparable set should be similar 
to the particular player’s salary. If a player’s salary is greater than the comparable set’s 
mean, then they are overvalued, if their salary is below the mean, they are undervalued. 
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The true difficulty is creating a dataset on which we run our analysis to determine these 
comparables. 
II. Literature Review 
My research about valuations of players focused on the NFL and NFL offensive 
lineman in specific. The valuation method for NFL athletes is mostly the same for each 
position: you take an output statistic like QBR for QBs, or Rushing Yards for RBs, or 
Receiving TDs for WRs and you analyze it over salary. Sometimes they use a blend of 
the available performance statistics, but it is, with the exception of QBs and QBR, all 
about counting stats that are not of particular fascination or complexity. Therein lies the 
true problem with valuation of offensive lineman in particular. There are no true output 
statistics specific to an offensive lineman’s performance. While this argument could be 
made with the QB throwing to a great WR, that there is always the confounding effects of 
a teammate on an individual player’s performance, the fact remains that there are no stats 
that even point to an offensive lineman’s performance.  
 The only existing system for the evaluation of an offensive lineman’s 
performance is through Pro Football Focus’s grading system. They establish a rubric, 
they watch the play, then they assign a value between -2 and 2 to the play. Not 
necessarily the outcome of the play, but the performance of the specific offensive 
lineman. They then normalize these grades based on situation and then they convert it to 
a 0-100 scale as the final grade breakdown. This is interesting, though clearly has a lot of 
flaws. There are many different graders and the grade is not based on an empirical 
analysis of the offensive lineman but on a subjective analysis. There was only one paper I 
 
5	
	
came across that attempted an interesting empirical analysis to find comparable offensive 
lineman. There were several others for other sports, but none for offensive lineman. The 
true challenge is finding the output of a lineman so I will begin with that paper. 
Byanna and Klabjan (2016): 
In this paper, Byanna and Klabjan [3] attempt to determine an empirical and 
objective way to measure the performance of an offensive lineman in the NFL. They first 
obtain a dataset of relevant metrics, 44 to be exact. A third of which are related to off-
field descriptors like height, weight, age, team, and several components of salary. The 
other two-thirds are the on-field descriptors. Like rush attempts to side, stuffs to side, 
passing yards, drop backs, etc. So it is really comprised of statistics that describe a 
player’s physical attributes, game-performance attributes, and salary attributes. The most 
important piece of the dataset however is the play-by-play breakdown of rushing attempts 
broken down by side as to allow for isolating of various offensive lineman.  
The biggest hurdle for this paper and mine is determining the responsibility for 
the offensive lineman versus the running back or quarterback. Is a 50-yard rush entirely 
attributable to the back’s performance? Or perhaps just some portion of it would be. That 
is where this paper and I have the largest difference in opinion. They treat a run where the 
running back breaks a tackle in the backfield and rushes for 8-yards as the same as when 
a running back runs untouched for 8-yards and gets tackled by the first defensive player 
he encounters. These runs are inherently different and clearly we can see where the credit 
for the run goes in either case, however I do understand that often the situation is far 
murkier and more difficult to parse out. However, this paper does show me that there is a 
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lot of room for improvement on this and I hope that my experience as an offensive 
lineman will allow me to comment on and determine a more objective way than is 
described in this paper. 
 They also highlight accolades as a relevant statistic though I think that is exactly 
the kind of thing we are trying to eliminate by conducting this analysis so I truly do not 
agree with its inclusion. The accolades I refer to are the pro-bowl/all-pro appearances. If 
the point is to find an objective measure of skill, then why would we include a popular 
vote as a metric in that determination? The Pro Bowl is voted on by three separate bodies, 
coaches, players, and fans. Each of the three groups count for one third of the final-vote. 
The question is, which of the three groups would be the most biased? The players do not 
all play each other so it is based on reputation. Maybe the coaches would be less biased 
because they likely scouted most players either pre-draft or at some point in preparation 
for a game. The most biased would almost certainly be the fans, they would vote for their 
home team players so the voting would likely favor large market players. As for all-pro 
that voting is done by the associated press, a panel of 50 media members. Perhaps these 
“experts” could eliminate bias in the voting process though I would say that is doubtful. 
The biggest difference in these two awards is the number of recipients, there are 86 
players named to the Pro Bowl versus the 27 who receive all-pro honors. Overall, the 
voting would likely favor big market, big name players who came from large college 
programs and were drafted high and stay relevant in the media, those things are not 
indicative of an objective measure of skill and their inclusion would likely bias our result. 
Their inclusion is completely antithetical to the argument being constructed. 
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One consideration the paper made that serves a good warning for my own 
analysis is their pool of player’s being analyzed. They eliminated anyone on their rookie 
contract because those are not really negotiated on a free market basis but based on draft 
position. They also eliminated any contract signed before the 2011 season due to the new 
collective bargaining agreement that should change the way those contracts are 
negotiated and structured. They also eliminated restricted free agents. All that means is 
that the current team has a chance to match any contract offered to the player and if they 
do match the contract then the player has to stay. They eliminated all these RFA contracts 
though I am not convinced this is necessary. An opportunity to match likely would not 
affect negotiations significantly enough to completely throw out the data. I think perhaps 
I need to do more research into the true nature of RFA contracts to see if they become 
problematic in my analysis of the dataset. 
The paper then went on to run several regressions to see whether the variables 
they have had a significant effect on the player’s salary. They separate the regressions 
into two individual predictors. One a regression of so-called “Performance” descriptors, 
and the other of “Experience” predictors. My biggest qualm with this selection is 
unfortunately double-edged. On one side I think the fact that they used various inter-line 
differentials as their performance descriptors is not a good choice. A left and right tackle 
on the same offensive lines would likely not be good comparisons to each other. I think 
perhaps a better choice would be left tackle versus every other left tackle. Though I see 
how if the differential is high within the offensive line you are in some way controlling 
for running back quality as we discussed before. Again I feel this is the toughest problem 
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to solve and I think perhaps a blend of inter-line differentials and league differentials is 
the solution to this problem. 
Perhaps the piece of this paper I am most interested in is the idea of using k-
means clustering to find comparisons for our offensive lineman. You would cluster using 
your performance and experience metrics. The theory being that if you cluster offensive 
lineman into some number of clusters then each cluster should have relatively the same 
salary. If they do not, then it is likely that the outlier in the cluster is either overvalued or 
undervalued. Once these disparities in value become apparent we can start to see the 
inconsistencies in the market for free agent offensive lineman that we are interested in. 
Why are they over or undervalued? It is that analysis that has not been conducted which I 
aim to do. 
Approximate Value from Pro Football Reference: 
 Approximate value3 (AV) is intended to be a measure of a specific player’s value 
in a given season. It is the creation of Pro-Football-Reference’s founder, Doug Drinen. 
Approximate value is a point system that creates a score in the following way, first 
calculate the total number of points to divvy up to the offensive line by the following 
formula: 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠'()* = 100 ∗ (𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒'()*)/(𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒7()89(:;<) 
Where offensive points per drive is calculated by: 
																																								 																				
3 http://www.pro-football-reference.com/blog/indexd961.html?page_id=8061 [3] 
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𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒'()* = 7 ∗ 𝑟𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑇𝐷 + 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑇𝐷 + 3 ∗ 𝐹𝐺𝑟𝑢𝑠ℎ𝑇𝐷 + 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑇𝐷 + 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝐹𝐺𝐴  
Those two equations give you the total amount of points to divvy up to the 
offense, but the offensive line is only five of the eleven players on the offense so to 
calculate the points to distribute to offensive linemen you must multiply by 5/11: 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠GHIJ( = 511 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠'()* 
 In order to take the team points and turn it into individual points you have to 
apply the individual points equation: 
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠LH)M(N = 𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑 + 5 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡 
Where the positional multipliers are 1.2 for tackles, and 1.0 for guards and centers. And 
the all-pro multiplier is calculated as 1.9 for first-team AP all-pro, 1.6 for second-team 
AP all-pro, and 1.3 for a pro bowler who was not first- or second-team all-pro. 
 Finally, in order to calculate the approximate value for each player you use the 
following equation: 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠WH)M(N( 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠WH)M(N ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠GHIJ()'()*  
There are two major issues with the assumptions in this system.4 First, it gives 
offensive linemen credit for their offense’s success, not theirs. The very first equation is 
just totaling up all the scores that an offensive lineman’s team scored in a season. Though 
																																								 																				
4 http://www.pro-football-reference.com/blog/index6b92.html?p=465 [5] 
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as we will expand on later that is a very bad measure of an individual lineman’s 
performance due to the fact that a bad lineman would be rewarded for having good 
teammates and a good offensive lineman would be punished for having bad teammates. 
The second major assumption is that it assumes that an offensive lineman is just 
as important in the run game as they are in the pass game. That may or may not be true in 
general, but it is certainly not true to specific teams. A team like the Saints is not as 
concerned with an offensive lineman’s run blocking ability as the Seahawks would be. Or 
even a tackle’s pass blocking ability versus a center’s run blocking ability would be 
valued differently.  
Pro-Football-Reference also uses approximate value to create a measure of a 
player’s value over a career. The measure they create is called Weighted Career 
Approximate Value (cAV) and is create very simply. You weight a player’s best season 
100%, and add their second best AV weighted 95%, then their third best weighted 90%, 
and on like that. 
Ethan Young5 offers an excellent analysis of the flaws with cAV in his article for 
insidethepylon.com where he attempts to adjust the AV formula to better measure the 
value of a player. The first critique is that cAV does control for career length, so a player 
with a 5-year career may have a lower cAV than an 8-year veteran even though the five-
year player has been more consistently valuable. This is also a big hindrance when 
dealing with players still active in the league because they have more seasons to play.  
																																								 																				
5 http://insidethepylon.com/football-science/football-statistics/2016/07/11/modified-
approximate-value-evaluation-model/ [6] 
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This is why in my analysis I will be using the average AV of a particular player. 
This is a fairly simple calculation as it is just the total AV divided by the number of 
seasons played. It is by no means a perfect measure a player’s value however in Doug 
Drinen’s words:  
AV is not meant to be a be-all end-all metric. Football stat lines just do not 
come close to capturing all the contributions of a player the way they do in 
baseball and basketball. If one player is a 16 and another is a 14, we can't 
be very confident that the 16AV player actually had a better season than 
the 14AV player. But I am pretty confident that the collection of all 
players with 16AV played better, as an entire group, than the collection of 
all players with 14AV6. 
So at the very least our AV numbers should provide intuition as to the quality of the 
player when viewed holistically, though it may be incapable of allowing for direct 
comparisons. 
Pro Football Focus Grading 
Pro Football Focus (PFF) has become somewhat of a hot topic in regards to its 
merit in evaluating performance of specific players. First I will give a description of the 
methodology and then I will go into some strengths and weaknesses of the system7. First, 
based on a set rubric, an analyst grades every individual on every single play and assigns 
a value from -2 to 2. The next phase is multilayered but all intended to ensure quality 
																																								 																				
6 http://www.pro-football-reference.com/blog/index37a8.html [7] 
7 https://www.profootballfocus.com/about/how-we-grade/ [8] 
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control. It involves another analyst evaluating the play without seeing the first’s grade, a 
third analyst then reviews the two grades and rules on any differences. The next piece of 
the quality assurance puzzle is verification by a coach from Pro Coach Network. 
The next phase in the grading process is unfortunately bit of a black box. Pro 
Football Focus refers to it as “Advanced Normalization” where they claim to take in the 
raw grades and account for the “situation,” which could mean a lot of things: down, 
distance, time in game, score in game, playoff game or not, etc. They claim it goes so far 
as to account for anything, “from where the player lined up to the drop-back depth of the 
quarterback, to everything in between.” Unfortunately, we cannot evaluate their 
methodology for doing this because it is completely proprietary and so not available to 
review. The unfortunate part is that is the meat of the analysis. What makes football 
especially difficult to evaluate is the uniqueness of every interaction between players 
based on innumerable factors. So that normalization process is the thing that makes PFF 
grades valuable more than just standard film analysis, but due to the fact that we cannot 
evaluate their methodology we are forced to just blindly trust their system. 
Though admittedly for all these flaws they do attempt to control for the 
performance of other players on the field which is incredibly important when evaluating 
players. For example, a quarterback should not be punished for a drop by a wide receiver. 
In the context of our problem an offensive lineman should not be punish for a running 
back slipping in the backfield for a 3-yard loss, much in the same way they should not be 
rewarded for a running back breaking 3 tackles and running for a 5-yard gain. These are 
the things we hope the PFF grade can control for. 
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The final step in PFF’s process is converting the resultant values into a grade on a 
scale from 0-100. They break down the grades into the following six categories: 
Characterization Grade 
Poor 0-59.9 
Below Average 60-69.9 
Average 70-79.9 
Above Average 80-84.9 
High Quality 85-89.9 
Elite 90-99.9 
 
These are the final numbers we as the consumers get to see. Some of the pros of using 
these are pretty straight forward. They offer some semblance of consistency due to their 
rubric and quality control process. Another pro is that they offer a single comparative 
statistic within position groups. 
 The list of cons is long and there is quite a bit out there with a simple google 
search.8 I will focus on three general critiques: the assumptions that have to be made, the 
math of the grades, and the dubious value that they provide.  
 The first issue is with the assumptions that get made during the course of the 
grading process. An offensive lineman’s job is often dictated at the outset of the play with 
a specific assignment. They also often work in combination with other offensive lineman 
to execute their assignment. So particularly in the context of negatively graded plays, one 
offensive lineman may be trying to make up for another’s mistake. There are countless 
scenarios that could play out based on the play selection that is completely irrespective of 
																																								 																				
8 http://www.fieldgulls.com/2014/11/1/7141027/brandon-mebane-pro-football-focus-and-
a-circle-of-handshakes [9] 
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a particular offensive lineman’s performance that may appear on film as if the offensive 
lineman erred, though that is not necessarily true. That is the major problem of evaluating 
performance on film without the context of play call and the understanding of what is 
being asked of an offensive lineman. The film also evaluates each play in a vacuum, an 
offensive lineman giving up a sack on 3rd and 5 down by 3 moving the team out of field 
goal range and losing the game is the same as a sack on 1st and 10 while up by 15 at the 
end of a game they have clearly already won. Admittedly there are merits to that as well, 
but in general most people would probably argue that it ignores a large part of what 
makes football interesting.  
 The second criticism is the pseudo-mathematical nature of the grading system. 
This is likely “an attempt at plausibility achieved by wearing the trappings of statistical 
analysis.”9 In particular the distributions of the grades is of particular interest. They claim 
to form a near normal distribution: 
Grade Frequency 
+2.0 0.01% 
+1.5 0.3% 
+1.0 16% 
+0.5 37%10 
-0.5 24% 
-1.0 22% 
-1.5 0.5% 
-2.0 0.01% 
  
																																								 																				
9 http://www.fieldgulls.com/2014/11/1/7141027/brandon-mebane-pro-football-focus-and-
a-circle-of-handshakes [9] 
10  The distribution is unbalanced due to the way RBs and WRs are rated 
 
15	
	
By artificially forcing the grades to be distributed in this way they inadvertently 
make a few claims. First that based on this distribution a play graded at -1 is 2,200 times 
more likely to occur than a play worth -2. Meaning that over a 16 game season, with 32 
teams all with 22 plyers playing per play, PFF awarded 58,007 -1 plays over the 2013 
season, but only 26 -2 plays. This fact remains while simultaneously we can say that two 
+1 plays are equivalent to a +2, though clearly we would have to say based on the 
distribution of their assignments that cannot be the case.  
 Aside from the issues with the nuts and bolts of the grading system there are some 
overarching concerns. First and foremost is the rise to prominence this system has 
achieved. In the past several years these grades have entered the main stream of sports 
debates. They have appeared everywhere from ESPN and Sports Illustrated, all the way 
to NBC’s Sunday Night Football. They have become a quick and easy way to justify or 
bash a player. So even though they were not intended to be an end all metric, they have 
become ubiquitous shorthand for the aptitude of a particular athlete. It is here that I 
should also mention the conflict of interest that NBC Sunday Night Football announcer 
Cris Collinsworth has in that he commonly cited these metrics and he is the owner of Pro 
Football Focus.11 
 All of this is not to say that the PFF grades are valueless, they most certainly have 
some merit. It is just to say that their use should be measured and thoughtful. This also 
																																								 																				
11 http://www.newsday.com/sports/football/giants/cris-collinsworth-liked-using-pro-
football-focus-so-he-bought-it-1.10940909 [10] 
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serves to highlight how difficult this process of evaluating NFL athletes and offensive 
linemen in particular is.  
III. Data 
Firstly, any data from before the 2012 season is already irrelevant to our analysis.  
This is due to the fact that a new collective bargaining agreement was signed in 2011. 
This changed the structure of NFL contracts significantly and rendered comparison 
between the contracts signed before and after the agreement less meaningful. I am also 
limiting my analysis to veteran players. This is due to the fact that rookies are signed to a 
fixed length and fixed salary contract based on their draft position not necessarily their 
skill. We use veteran players because there is an open market place allowing us to see an 
open market valuation of a player based on the contract they signed. I have collected data 
on all veteran offensive lineman who took a non-trivial amount of snaps in the 2016 
season. Excluding long snappers, that leaves 116 offensive linemen in the 2016 season. 
Besides the obvious descriptive variables like name and team, the data set includes 
variables that can be split into five general categories: Compensation, Experience, 
Athleticism, Accolades, and Performance. 
Compensation: 
The compensation statistics refer to the payment structures for the players. NFL 
contracts are very complicated beasts and can vary widely in payout structures.  In 
general, there is really only one special consideration when looking at them and that is 
the guaranteed money portion. In the MLB all contracts are guaranteed, so when a player 
signs a $100 million contract the team owes them $100 million. That is not the case in the 
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NFL and so one must be cognizant of that fact when discussing NFL contracts. Often 
NFL teams will front load a contract with the guaranteed money in the form of a signing 
bonus, so a seven-year $100 million contract might result in three years of play for $40 
million and then an option to extend at a prohibitively high cost for the remaining four 
years.  The compensation statistics I collected are as follows12: 
Name: Description: 
Total Value The total dollar amount of the contract 
Average per Year Total dollar amount divided by the duration of the contract 
Avg. Guar. per year Total guarantee divided by the duration of the contract 
Percent Guaranteed Total Guarantee divided by Total Value 
 
Experience Statistics: 
 The experience statistics13 are a measure of a veteran’s status in the league. One 
of the common clichés offered by broadcasters and talking heads alike when there is a 
veteran free agent signed is that a certain player offers a great locker room presence. Age 
and experience obviously matter to NFL front offices. Similar to any other job, a body of 
work, and especially a successful body of work enhances the value of any employee.  
Name: Description: 
Games Played Number of games with at least one snap played  
Starts Number of games in which the player started 
Years in League (Exp) Number of seasons a player has played 
Power Five College Binary Variable—Is the alma mater in a power 5 conference  
																																								 																				
12 All salary data was collected from OvertheCap.com [11] 
13 All experience statistics were collected from profotballreference.com [12] 
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The only statistic here that merits any additional explanation is the Power Five 
conference categorical variable. It is a 1 if the college a player graduated from is in a 
power 5 conference and a 0 if it is not. The power five conferences are the Atlantic Coast 
Conference (ACC), Big Ten Conference (B1G), Big 12 Conference, Pac-12 Conference, 
and the Southeastern Conference (SEC), all are in NCAA Division one14. 
Athleticism: 
 Almost every player in the NFL participated in a pre-draft combine or pro-day 
whether or not they went drafted into the league. At these combines they collect all the 
measurables one could dream of, all the way down to hand size. They also have the 
athletes test on a series of drills that are common to all combines and pro-days. The ones 
relevant to offensive linemen and therefore the ones I collected are as follows.15 
Name: Description: 
Height Height in inches 
Weight Weight in pounds 
3-Cone Drill Time to complete the 3-cone drill 
Vertical Jump Vertical jump in inches 
Broad Jump Broad jump in inches 
Bench Press Repetitions completed at the 225lb bench press 
40 Yard Dash Time to complete the 40 yard dash 
20 Yard Shuttle Time to complete the 20 yard shuttle 
 
																																								 																				
14 See Table 1 in the Appendix for a complete listing of conferences 
15 All testing info comes from http://www.nfldraftscout.com [13] 
 
19	
	
Accolades: 
 A high profile athlete is sure to be more valuable to a franchise than a lesser 
known one for more than just on-field reasons. For this reason, it is important to take into 
account accolades in our analysis. I have chosen to focus on the following four major 
accolades. 
Name: Description: 
Pro Bowl16 Counts the number of times a player has been to the pro bowl 
All Pro17 Counts the number of times a player has been voted all pro 
Super Bowl Champ Counts the number of times a player has won the super bowl 
Draft Position18 The overall draft number in their respective draft 
Pro Bowl rosters are determined by a hybrid vote of NFL coaches, NFL players, 
and fans. Each groups votes are weighted as one third of the overall vote. All-pro voting 
is done by the Associated Press every year. They select a first team and a second team 
that each consist of one player at each position. So there are 10 total all-pro offensive 
linemen each year. I counted a first team and a second team nomination equally in my 
analysis. The super bowl champion statistic is important because of a well-known and 
discussed phenomenon of the super bowl premium. It is a discussed thing in contract 
negotiations and it is known that players who have won a super bowl are paid more, 
especially if they won the super bowl the year prior to their contract signing. The 
																																								 																				
16 Pro bowl rosters can be found at pro football reference: http://www.pro-football-
reference.com/probowl/index.htm [14] 
17 A list of every all-pro roster can be found at PFR: http://www.pro-football-
reference.com/awards/ [15] 
18 Draft positions can be found at pro football reference [12] 
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converse can also be true, a veteran may be willing to play for less money if they are 
without a super bowl win and negotiating with a potential contender. 
Performance: 
 These statistics are at the heart of the question we are trying to answer. A player’s 
on-field ability is likely the largest factor in determining their value to a given team. 
There are relatively few statistics that attempt to capture an offensive line production, and 
even fewer still that attempt to isolate an individual offensive lineman’s specific 
contributions. I have attempted to find a few that attempt to do just that and some I have 
modified further still. The difficulty in choosing statistics to measure an offensive 
lineman’s performance is that you can almost never measure his production directly. You 
can only ever collect data on an offensive lineman as a function of some other player’s 
performance, like a running back for rushing or a quarterback and receiver for passing. 
The complete list of performance statistics I collected can be found in Table 2 in the 
Appendix, the following list is only those I used in my analysis. 
Name19: Description: 
NYOA per play Net Yards over Average per play 
Rushing NYOA per Rush Net Rushing Yards over average per rush 
Passing NYOA per Pass Net passing yards over average per pass 
Passing Differential Average pass with player minus average pass without 
Rushing Differential Average rush with player minus average rush without 
Snap Adjusted ALY20 Snap-count-adjusted Adjusted Line Yards 
																																								 																				
19 The first five statistics listed are taken from the NFLGSIS data base [16] 
20 Can be found at Football Outsiders: http://www.footballoutsiders.com/stats/ol [17] 
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The Net Yards Over Average stats are all taken from the NFLGSIS database and come 
with the following explanations: 
• NYOA per Play: net yardage gained by the team while the player was on the field 
over a rolling six-year league average factoring in field position, down, and 
distance. For example: in the 2011 season the League average gain for 1st and 10 
on the offense's 20-yard line was 5.99 yards. If the player participated in a play at 
1st and 10 on his own 20 that gained 8 yards he'd earn 2.01 net yards over the 
League average. 
• Rushing NYOA per Rush: net yardage over the League average for rushing plays 
only, factoring in field position, down, and distance.  
• Passing NYOA per Pass: net yardage over the League average for passing plays 
only, factoring in field position, down, and distance 
The differential stats are defined as follows: 
• Passing Differential: Average length of pass when player is on the field minus the 
average length of a pass when the player is not on the field. 
• Rushing Differential: Average length of a rush when a player is on the field minus 
the average length of rush when a player is not on the field 
The snap-count-adjusted ALY requires a bit lengthier of an explanation, though I 
think it may be the most valuable measure of an offensive lineman’s contribution to the 
run game and likely does the best job of controlling for the performance of other players. 
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What it attempts to do it create a measure of an offensive lineman’s contribution to the 
run game. 
In order to analyze the effect an offensive lineman has on the run game, we must 
parse out the difference between an offensive lineman’s contribution to a run and the 
running back’s. This is inherently difficult to do because there is no existing true measure 
of just the offensive lineman’s contribution to the run game. There are some statistics 
kept to rank entire offensive lines as a collective unit, but very few attempt to isolate a 
single offensive lineman. For run blocking, the unit stats that would be relevant to our 
analysis would be21: 
1. Power Success Percentage: Yards per carry by that team's running backs, 
according to standard NFL numbers. 
2. RB Yards: Percentage of runs on third or fourth down, two yards or less to go, 
that achieved a first down or touchdown. Also includes runs on first-and-goal 
or second-and-goal from the two-yard line or closer. This is the only statistic 
on this page that includes quarterbacks. 
3. Stuffed Percentage: Percentage of runs where the running back is tackled at or 
behind the line of scrimmage.  
4. Second Level Yards: Yards which this team's running backs earn between 5-
10 yards past the line of scrimmage, divided by total running back carries 
																																								 																				
21 All of these stats and descriptions are from Football outsiders and can be found at: 
http://www.footballoutsiders.com/stats/ol [17] 
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5. Open field Yards: Yards which this team's running backs earn more than 10 
yards past the line of scrimmage, divided by total running back carries 
These statistics are interesting to look at and will be discussed and analyzed further 
however they are difficult to individualize. My theory would be to take a stuffed 
percentage and multiply by the percent of runs for a given team at an individual player 
and then multiply by the percentage of snaps for which that player was on the field 
however that has one major flaw. The flaw is that this methodology punishes a strong 
player for having weak teammates and rewards a weak player for having strong 
teammates. 
 So then the question becomes distilling the remaining stats into an individualized 
and relevant statistic. Football Outsiders provides the method for doing just that in a 
statistic that they call Adjusted Line Yards. Adjusted line yards attempts to control 
running back quality and create a measure of simply the offensive line’s contribution to 
the run game. Based on their regression analysis the formula takes in all running back 
carries and assigns responsibility to offensive lineman in the following way22: 
Run Type Responsibility Multiplier 
Losses 120% 
0-4 Yards 100% 
5-10 Yards 50% 
11+ Yards 0% 
 
																																								 																				
22 Description of ALY offered by: http://www.footballoutsiders.com/stats/ol [17] 
 
24	
	
The resulting numbers are then adjusted based on down, distance, situation, opponent, 
and the difference in rushing average between shotgun compared to standard formations. 
Finally, we normalize the numbers so that the league average for Adjusted Line Yards 
per carry is the same as the league average for RB yards per carry23. 
 It is simple enough based on the information provided by Football Outsiders to 
assign those ALY numbers to individual offensive lineman. Football Outsiders provides a 
table that lists a team’s ALY based on run direction split into 5 categories: Left End, Left 
Tackle, Mid/Guard, Right Tackle, Right End. It is then just a matter of matching the team 
and direction to the player that plays there. For example, a run at the Dallas Left tackle is 
attributed to Tyron Smith, and a run at the Atlanta Mid/Guard is attributed to Chris 
Chester, Andy Levitre and Alex Mack. This attribution scheme is based on the fact that 
Football Outsider’s research so far shows no statistically significant difference between 
how well a team performs on runs listed middle, left guard, and right guard24. 
 I then take these ALY numbers generated by Football Outsiders and adjust them 
based on player snap counts. The idea being that a player is not on the field for every 
single run play, especially when dealing with injury or competition with another player 
resulting in split playing time, or for countless other reasons25. I created this snap-count-
adjusted ALY by multiplying the percentage of snaps played by a given player that 
																																								 																				
23 A more in-depth description of ALY can be found at: 
http://www.footballoutsiders.com/info/methods#aly [18] 
24 Found at http://www.footballoutsiders.com/stats/ol under the ALY by direction table 
[17] 
25 This dataset does exist though is prohibitively expensive to acquire. 
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season. This creates my snap-count-adjusted ALY statistic that is used in the overall 
performance analysis. 
Miscellaneous: 
 I collected several other variables that will be important in answering some 
interesting questions along the way.  
Name: Description: 
Race Binary: 1 if Black, 0 else 
Arrested26 Binary: 1 if arrested before, 0 else 
Major Market27 Binary: 1 if on team in major market, 0 else 
 
I defined a major market city as one that is in the top half of the market size data that I 
collected. Arrested includes any offense that resulted in an arrest, felonies are treated the 
same as misdemeanors and any other infraction that resulted in arrest. 
IV. Variable Relevance 
Now that we have described the variables we are interested in we have to figure 
out which ones are relevant when determining the value of an offensive lineman. In order 
to do that we will again separate the independent variables into four categories: 
Experience, Athleticism, Accolades, and Performance. And we will regress them on our 
four Compensation metrics as the dependent variable. So we will specify sixteen separate 
																																								 																				
26 Arrest info collected from USA today at: http://www.usatoday.com/sports/nfl/arrests/ 
[19] 
27 Market size data collected by Reddit User rderekp [20] 
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regressions and determine which variables are statistically significant on our salary 
metrics. We will also include a dummy variable called tackle, which is a 1 if the player is 
a tackle and a 0 if they are a guard or center. This is due to the fact that it is likely the two 
groups are paid differently so we want to control for that fact in our regressions. 
In all of the following regressions we have chosen to use robust standard errors in 
order to attempt to correct for the heteroskedasticity that is almost certainly present in our 
models. The error term likely depends on our relevant variables in ways we cannot say 
exactly how.   
Experience: 
For experience we regressed our battery of experience variables on Log of total 
value, percent of contract guaranteed, Average amount paid per year, and Average 
guaranteed per year respectively. We will first look at Log (Total Value) as the dependent 
variable, whose specification is as follows: 
log 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 	𝛽] + 𝛽^𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽a𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽b	𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽d𝐸𝑥𝑝 +	𝛽f𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 	𝜀 
The full regression output can be found in Table 3 of the Appendix. This regression 
yielded an R-Squared of .334 meaning that around 33% of the variability in Log (Total 
Value) can be explained by our model. In this regression the only two variables that are 
statistically significant are Gamesplayed and Starts with coefficients of -.300 and .040 
respectively. Both were significant at the 99% level with Gamesplayed having a t-stat of-
3.31 and starts having a t-stat of 5.88. These coefficients generally make sense as a 
consistent starter would certainly bring more value to a team. The negative coefficient on 
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Gamesplayed however is somewhat curious. It is likely due to the fact that we are dealing 
with exclusively veteran offensive lineman that all have significant games played. That 
coupled with the fact that Gamesplayed is really just another measure for age and the 
greater the age means limited games remaining in the tank. That could be why as 
Gamesplayed increases, Log (Total Salary Decreases). 
 The second regression specification for our Experience statistics uses 
PercentGuaranteed as the dependent variable and is specified as follows: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑑 = 	𝛽] + 𝛽^𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽a𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽b	𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽d𝐸𝑥𝑝 +	𝛽f𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 	𝜀 
This regression yielded an R-Squared of only .100, which is very low for our uses.28 It 
also only resulted in Starts being statistically significant with a coefficient of .002 and a t-
stat of 2.33. Neither of these facts are particularly surprising due to the fact that 
PercentGuaranteed is likely a poor measure of value to an organization. This is due to the 
fact that you would like to assume that the greater the PercentGuaranteed the more 
valuable the player. This however is not the case, a valuable player would likely be given 
a large, multi-year deal. This would result in a large portion of the contract being in the 
fairly distant future and so not guaranteed. That would result in a lower 
PercentGuaranteed. On the other end of the spectrum a weaker player may be offered a 
one-year deal with all of the money guaranteed, artificially inflating their 
PercentGuaranteed. Scenarios like these can be conjured up ad nauseam concerning our 
																																								 																				
28 A full Regression report can be found in Table 4 of the Appendix 
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PercentGuaranteed metric. It is because of this variability that it will be omitted from any 
further analysis in this section29. 
 The next dependent variable to look at is Avg./Yr. the regression specification is 
as follows: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒/𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 𝛽] + 𝛽^𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽a𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽b	𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽d𝐸𝑥𝑝 +	𝛽f𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 	𝜀 
This regression resulted in the highest R-Squared value of any of the experience 
specifications with a value of .430.30 This means that 43% of the variability in Avg./Yr. 
can be explained by our variables. This regression also resulted in Gamesplayed and 
Starts being significant at the 99% level with coefficients of -80,593 and 103,032 
respectively. The signs of these coefficients remaining the same as with the Log (Total 
Value) specification is likely due to the same reason as mentioned above. PowerFive was 
also statistically significant here at the 95% level with a coefficient of 876,808 and a t-
stat 1.99.  
 The final dependent variable to look at in relation to the experience variables is 
Guarantee/ Yr. Its specification is as follows: 
𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 	𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽3	𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 	𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 	𝜀 
With an R-Squared of .430 our model is capable of explaining 43% of the variability in 
the dependent variable.31 Similar to the Avg./Yr. specification all three of our 
																																								 																				
29 See the Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix for complete PercentGuaranteed results 
30 See table 5 in the Appendix for a full report 
31 A full report can be found in Table 4 of the Appendix 
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Gamesplayed, Starts, and PowerFive variables were statistically significant, though this 
time all were significant at the 99% level. The signs also match the previous 
specifications giving us an even stronger reason to believe their accuracy. 
 With all of our Experience regressions showing Starts as significant it seems like 
it is definitely relevant when determining the value of an offensive lineman. All three of 
our relevant specifications also found Gameplayed as significant and two of our three 
found PowerFive to be significant. The only variable consistently insignificant was years 
in the league or Exp. For that reason, we will use Gameplayed, Starts, and PowerFive in 
our cluster analysis and we will leave Exp out. Our tackle dummy was also significant in 
all three specifications, a result that will be expanded on later. 
Athleticism: 
All three of our athleticism regressions seem to provide little to no insight as to 
the valuation of offensive lineman.32 The average R-Squared of our three models was 
.135 with the tackle variable specified and only an average of .077 without that dummy 
included. Those numbers along with the insignificance of almost every single variable 
provide more than enough justification for classifying this stable of variables as 
irrelevant. They will therefore not be included in our cluster analysis.  
This also logically makes sense as these numbers we from at least four years prior 
to the contract sign date and often even longer. Along with that fact is the claim that these 
numbers are in general fairly irrelevant for offensive lineman. The ability to run 40 yards 
																																								 																				
32 All three specifications and their outputs can be found in Table 6 of the Appendix 
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fast is particularly not useful to a 300-pound man who is asked to move at most 10 yards 
on any given play. We will return to these stats later on to attempt to answer a different 
question later. 
Accolades33: 
Accolades are interesting in that they should serve almost as a proxy for the 
ability that we are unable to measure in the performance statistics. While they are 
subjective they still have merit as it would seem a large portion of an offensive lineman’s 
ability is subjective.  
The first specification is that of Log (Total Value) as the dependent variable. That 
specification is as follows: 
log 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽] + +𝛽^𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽a𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽b𝑃𝑟𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑤𝑙 + 𝛽d𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑜 + 𝛽f𝑆𝐵𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑚𝑝 + 𝜀 
With an R-squared of only .239 this model is likely the weakest in this category, though it 
does still show ProBowl as being significant at the 99% level and SBChamp at the 95% 
level. Neither is a particularly interesting result as it is pretty self-explanatory that being 
voted one of the best lineman in the league would result in higher pay. The Super bowl 
premium has also been discussed before.  
 Avg./Yr. next dependent variable to look at, it is specified as follows: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑤𝑙 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑜 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐵𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑚𝑝 + 𝜀 
																																								 																				
33 A full regression Report can be found in Table 7 of the Appendix 
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The Avg./Yr. regression finds all but the AllPro variable significant at minimum the 95% 
level. With an R-Squared of .391 this model is capable of explaining 39% of the 
variability in Avg./Yr. That along with the fact that all but the AllPro variable is 
significant is a fairly strong result. 
The final dependent variable to look at in relation to the experience variables is 
Guarantee/ Yr. Its specification is as follows: 
𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 	𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑤𝑙 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑜 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐵𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑚𝑝 + 𝜀 
It is in this specification that we find a curious result. All four variables are significant at 
the 95% level or more. Though we find an interesting result in the all pro statistic, we 
find a negative relationship between the guaranteed money and all-pro accolade. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that these big time players are offered far larger contract though 
the guarantees are similar to their non-all-pro peers and therefor these guaranteed rate 
stats appear to be lower when in fact the total guarantees are larger. 
 In all three of our regressions we found ProBowl to be significant at the 99% 
level. We also found SBChamp to be significant at either the 99% or 95% level. Due to 
those results both will be included in the cluster analysis. AllPro was only significant in 
the Avg. Guarantee per Year specification and had a curious sign. It is however arguably 
more prestigious than the ProBowl so for that reason it will be included in the cluster 
analysis. I also included the PowerFive statistic in these regressions as it also seems to be 
somewhat of an accolade, it being significant in several of the specifications only further 
justifies its inclusion in the cluster analysis. 
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Performance: 
The final stable of variables to analyze is the set of Performance variables34. With 
R-Squared values of .228, 215, and .106 for Log (Total Value) Avg. per year, and Avg. 
Guaranteed per year respectively, all the models fail to adequately explain the variability 
in their respective dependent variables. These low R-Squared values can likely be 
explained by the variability in offensive styles of all the various teams in the NFL.  
There are statistics here that are attempting to quantify an individual’s 
contribution, to the run game, to the pass game, and their performance compared to an 
average offensive lineman. This however does not hamper an attempt at cluster analysis. 
The whole point of doing the cluster analysis is finding a comparable set of similar 
offensive lineman. So the fact that these variables are attempting to capture a lot is 
perhaps even a positive. It is for that reason that all of them will still be included in the 
cluster analysis. 
Tackle vs. Interior Lineman: 
The tackle positon is likely to be inherently more valuable than the interior 
offensive lineman. The tackle variable has been significant in all of our relevant 
regressions at the least at the 95% level. This is strong evidence that there is likely an 
inherent difference between tackles and interior offensive linemen salaries. 
																																								 																				
34 The Regression results for all of the Performance variables can be found in Table 8 of 
the Appendix 
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We can also show that our new categorical variable tackle is significant on all three 
relevant measures of compensation when controlling for our other statistics.  The tackle 
variable across all three measures of compensation has a significant positive coefficient, 
meaning that in fact the tackles are paid more relative to guards and centers35. 
V. Theory and Methodology 
In the finance world one way to find the value of an asset or company is to find a 
comparable asset or company that you can value and use that to estimate the value of 
whatever it is that you are interested in. I believe this theory can be applied to offensive 
lineman valuation as well. The hurdle here is building a comparative set of offensive 
lineman on which to base the valuation. That is where cluster analysis comes in. Cluster 
analysis is one method to build that comparative set.  
K-means creates k groups from a set of objects so that the members of a group are 
similar. The way the algorithm works is as follows36: 
1. Plot all of the observations in multidimensional space 
2. Initialize k centers (or means) 
3.  Each observation will be closest to 1 of k of these centers forming clusters 
around these centers. Now we have k clusters with each observation a member 
of some cluster 
4. Now calculate a new mean for each of those clusters based on its observations 
																																								 																				
35 See Table 15 in the Appendix for a full regression report 
36 Paraphrased from Data Mining Lecture Notes (Math 166/ CSCI 145) by Prof. Blake 
Hunter (CMC) [21] 
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5. With these new means created there is a possibility some observations are 
now closer to a different mean and so need to be associated with that new 
cluster 
6. Recalculate the centers with the new membership accounted for. 
7. Repeat steps 3-6 until the centers do not change and you have a stable set of 
clusters. This is called convergence. 
The theory would be that each cluster would be our set of comparables. They will 
cluster into hard to describe patterns as we are working in a very high-dimensional space 
making descriptive analysis difficult. The thrust of the clustering would be that every 
offensive lineman should be getting paid a number relatively close to the cluster mean of 
whatever salary metric we choose. If they are making significantly more they are 
overvalued, if they are making significantly less they are undervalued. That is the heart of 
the question of the thesis.  
The purpose of the above regressions was to get a feel for the significance and 
relevance of each of our variables in terms of value to franchises. Now the goal is to use 
this info to assist in the process of creating our comparative sets. Based on the above 
regressions I have chosen the following variables to cluster on: 
Experience: Performance: Accolades: 
Games Played NYOA per Play Pro Bowl 
Starts Snap adj. ALY All-Pro 
Power_Five Rushing Differential Super Bowl Champ 
 Passing Differential  
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Clustering can be sensitive37 to one statistic dominating the clustering if it is 
relatively large compared to the others. So first I normalized all the not categorical 
variables to the ranges of either [0,1] or [-1,1] depending on whether or not sign was 
relevant to the specific statistic. The goal of the normalization is to attempt to control for 
one of these variables dominating the clustering process. The number of clusters I chose 
to find was eight clusters. 
Using these groups, I will then find the cluster means and standard deviations of 
Log (Total Value), Average per year and Avg. Guaranteed per year for each of the eight 
clusters. Using those means I can create a score that is the number of standard deviations 
a particular player’s values are from their cluster’s mean value. I can then flag every 
player who had a value for each of our relevant metrics that was at least one standard 
deviation away from the mean for further analysis. 
I will then create a set of players that appear frequently above or below their 
cluster means based on all three of the compensation metrics I am interested in. Using 
those three metrics we then see which ones appear consistently above or below the cluster 
means. 
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VI. Results 
The clustering algorithm grouped the 116 offensive lineman into eight separate 
clusters with the following frequencies: 
Cluster Frequency 
1 8 
2 22 
3 8 
4 12 
5 8 
6 25 
7 11 
8 22 
 
A full description of the clusters and which lineman belong to which cluster can be found 
in Table 9 of the Appendix.  
 The algorithm flagged 17 players as possibly overvalued based on Log (Total 
Value), 24 based on Average Salary per year, and another 19 based on Average 
Guarantee per year. Full tables of those three groups can be found in Table 10 of the 
Appendix. Using all three lists in concert we can assemble a list of 13 offensive linemen 
that appeared on the overvalued list for all three metrics: 
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Compensation 
Metric: log(Total Val) Avg/ year 
Avg Guar/ 
year 
Name Cluster Value (Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Branden 
Albert 2 
17.67 
(1.312) 
9,400,000 
(1.648) 
4,000,000 
(1.500) 
Jeff  
Allen 
4 17.15 (1.858) 
7,000,000 
(2.505) 
3,000,000 
(2.512) 
Tony 
Bergstrom 3 
15.56 
(2.201) 
2,875,000 
(2.470) 
750,000 
(2.466) 
Duane 
Brown 2 
17.79 
(1.421) 
8,900,000 
(1.465) 
3,680,250 
(1.281) 
Marcus 
Cannon 7 
17.30 
(1.331) 
6,500,000 
(1.475) 
2,470,000 
(1.177) 
King 
Dunlap 1 
17.15 
(1.441) 
7,000,000 
(1.862) 
2,125,000 
(1.931342) 
Cordy 
Glenn 8 
17.91 
(1.227) 
12,000,000 
(2.033) 
5,300,000 
(2.142) 
Alex  
Mack 
2 17.62 (1.274) 
9,000,000 
(1.502) 
4,000,000 
(1.500) 
Kelechi 
Osemele 8 
17.90 
(1.199) 
11,700,000 
(1.934) 
5,080,000 
(1.989) 
Jermey 
Parnell 7 
17.28 
(1.318) 
6,400,000 
(1.432) 
2,900,000 
(1.579) 
Geoff 
Schwartz 7 
17.31 
(1.343) 
6,600,000 
(1.518) 
2,532,000 
(1.235) 
Donald 
Stephenson 4 
16.45 
(1.293) 
4,666,667 
(1.302) 
2,000,000 
(1.425) 
Trent 
Williams 6 
18.01 
(1.067) 
13,200,000 
(2.0767) 
6,000,000 
(1.743) 
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 The algorithm flagged 17 as undervalued based on Log (Total Value), 15 based 
on Average per Year, and another 12 based on Guarantee per Year. Full tables for those 
can be found in Table 11 of the Appendix. Aggregating across lists leaves us with 7 
linemen that appear undervalued for all three metrics: 
Compensation 
Metric: log(Total Val) Avg/ year 
Avg Guar/ 
year 
Name Cluster Value (Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Byron 
Bell 8 
14.63 
(-2.399) 
2,250,000 
(-1.201) 
650,000 
(-1.105) 
Chris 
Chester 5 
14.67 
(-1.917) 
2,350,000 
(-1.969) 
250,000 
(-1.619) 
Vladimir 
Ducasse 7 
13.54 
(-1.669) 
760,000 
(-1.014) 
0 
(-1.132) 
Marshall 
Newhouse 8 
14.91 
(-2.081) 
1,500,000 
(-1.450) 
500,000 
(-1.210) 
Matt 
Slauson 2 
14.91 
(-1.053) 
1,500,000 
(-1.236) 
300,000 
(-1.030) 
John 
Sullivan 2 
13.69 
(-2.102) 
885,000 
(-1.461) 
0 
(-1.235) 
Eric 
Winston 2 
13.90 
(-1.923) 
1,090,000 
(-1.386) 
80,000 
(-1.180) 
 
 We also found that there was a statistically significant difference between interior 
offensive lineman and tackles. With that in mind I decided to conduct my exact same 
clustering methodology on the data but this time I ran the algorithm twice, once just on 
tackles, and once on guards and centers. A complete detailing of these results can be 
found in Tables 13 through 16 of the Appendix. Of the 13 lineman flagged as potentially 
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overvalued by the original algorithm, our two positional algorithms flagged all but two of 
them. And on the undervalued side of the original 7 that were flagged as potentially 
undervalued our positional algorithms flagged all but one of them. 
VII. Discussion 
For the discussion section we will pick a few of the players flagged by the 
algorithm and take a deeper dive into their specific situations to gain some intuition for 
the algorithm itself. For the potentially overvalued players we will take a look at: Jeff 
Allen, Tony Bergstrom, and Kelechi Osemele. For the potentially undervalued we will 
look at: Marshall Newhouse, John Sullivan, and Matt Slauson. We will also look at some 
other interesting questions that stem from our results. 
Jeff Allen: 
Jeff Allen played Right Guard for the Houston Texans in the 2016 NFL season, 
he started all 14 games he appeared in before his season was cut short due to a 
concussion suffered in week 14 against the Colts.38 His contract with the Texans includes 
$28,000,000 in total over 4 years for an average of $7,000,000 per year. The contact 
includes $12,000,000 in guarantees for an average of $3,000,000 guaranteed per year. 
These numbers put Allen at the 16h highest paid guard in the NFL out of 159.39 In 
contrast to that ranking, Allen grades out as the 65th best guard according to Pro Football 
Focus with a grade of 48.5 putting him well into the “poor” category for PFF.40 He also 
																																								 																				
38 http://www.rotoworld.com/recent/nfl/7536/jeff-allen [22] 
39 https://overthecap.com/player/jeff-allen/510/ [11] 
40 https://grades.profootballfocus.com/#/ratings/positions/show/G [23] 
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finds himself at the bottom half of the league for Net Yards Over Average per Play, 
Rushing Differential and Passing Differential41. 
While we cannot definitely say he is overvalued, based on the above statistics it 
would seem that he is definitely being paid more money than his peers that perform at a 
similar level. Jeff Allen had a good 2015 season with the Chiefs before he signed his 
large contract with the Texans. He graded out at an 81.9 according to Pro Football Focus, 
and he recorded starts at LT, RT, and LG proving himself to be a versatile lineman. He 
also finished the 2015 season in the top half of NYOA per Play along with being near the 
top of the league in both Rushing and Passing Differential. Allen serves as a potential 
warning to NFL executives about the woes of valuation on a single season.  
Tony Bergstrom: 
Tony Bergstrom plays center for the Houston Texans and was signed in the same 
offseason as Jeff Allen. He appeared in 14 games for the Texans in 2016, though did not 
record a single start with the team. The Texans inked a contract worth a total of 
$5,750,000 over two years for an average of $2,875,000 per year. The contract included 
$1,500,000 in guarantees over those two years for $750,000 guaranteed per year. 
Bergstrom was the 13th highest paid center out of 81 total centers in the NFL in the 2016 
season though took only two total snaps at the center position for the Texans.42 Pro 
Football Focus does not offer rankings for players with only two snaps. He was also cut 
by the Texans in the 2016-2017 offseason. 
																																								 																				
41 http://www.nflgsis.com/GameStatsLive/LegacyReports [16] 
42 https://overthecap.com/player/tony-bergstrom/1301/ [11] 
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Kelechi Osemele: 
Kelechi Osemele plays left guard for the Oakland Raiders in the 2016 season. In 
2016 he notched 15 starts missing only one game due to kidney stones.43 He signed a 
massive $58,500,000 contract to be paid out over 5 years for an average salary of 
$11,700,000 per year. His contract comes with $25,400,000 in guarantees, amounting to 
$5,080,000 per year in guarantees. These values rank Osemele the second highest paid 
guard and the highest paid left guard in the entire league.44 However, in contrast to the 
two offensive lineman previously discussed, Osemele may have the numbers to back up 
such a contract. Pro Football Focus ranks Osemele as the fifth best guard in the NFL and 
his grade of 87.7 is within 1.5 of the number two spot at guard.45 Those numbers along 
with his top 20 finishes in NYoA per play, passing differential, and rushing NYoA make 
a strong case for him being one of the top guards in the NFL.46  
Kelechi Osemele serves to highlight a potential hiccup in the algorithm. He is 
likely at the top of the guard market and deservedly so. The algorithm cannot account for 
his high salary in regards to his other statistics because he is setting the market for guards 
in the NFL. This happened with several other players as well, most notably Joe Thomas 
of the Browns and Trent Williams of the Redskins. This only goes to show that the 
algorithm flags players for further analysis, it does not provide a definitive answer as to 
the relative value of an individual player.  
																																								 																				
43 http://www.rotoworld.com/player/nfl/7504/kelechi-osemele [22] 
44 https://overthecap.com/player/kelechi-osemele/1385/ [11] 
45 https://grades.profootballfocus.com/#/ratings/positions/show/G [23] 
46 http://www.nflgsis.com/GameStatsLive/LegacyReports [16] 
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Trent Williams sits at the top of Pro Football Focus’s rankings with an overall 
grade of  92.8 granting him elite status.47 He is the highest paid tackle by overall total and 
by total guarantee, though he is edged out in Average per year by only $50,000 by Russel 
Okung who is himself a bit of an oddity to the algorithm to be discussed later.48 
Marshall Newhouse: 
Marshall Newhouse played the 2016 season at right tackle for the New York 
Giants. He appeared in ten games, but only started six for the Giants. This offseason he 
signed a new contract with the Raiders for $3,500,000 total over two years with $500,000 
of that being guaranteed. This contracts makes Newhouse the 65th highest paid tackle in 
the NFL.49 His PFF grade for the 2016 season was 69.4 making him just barely below 
average though his pass blocking grade is 75.1, firmly in the average range.50 He also 
holds a top 20 rushing differential and sits firmly in the middle of the pack for the 
majority of the statistics we have looked at.51  
All this is to say that Newhouse is likely a league average offensive tackle yet he 
is paid about half of the average tackle salary per year of $3,568,994 per year. So he is 
possibly underpaid based on our analysis though again this is not meant to be a holistic 
evaluation method. 
 
																																								 																				
47 https://grades.profootballfocus.com/#/ratings/positions/show/T [22] 
48 https://overthecap.com/player/trent-williams/1466 [11] 
49 https://overthecap.com/contracts/ [11] 
50 https://grades.profootballfocus.com/#/ratings/positions/show/T [22] 
51 http://www.nflgsis.com/GameStatsLive/LegacyReports [16] 
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John Sullivan: 
John Sullivan played center for the Washington Redskins in the 2016. He 
appeared in 13 games though only started one. He just inked a one-year $999,999 
contract with the Los Angeles Rams making him the 33rd highest paid center in the 
league. In 2015 he sat out all 16 games due to back surgery.52 Prior to this injury he 
started 93 games over six season for the Vikings.53 Over the four seasons prior to his 
surgery, 2011 to 2014 his PFF grades were: 90.7, 86.3, 87.7, and 82.9. Making him an 
elite center for a season before settling in at the above average to high quality levels.  
In his almost 100 snaps in 2016 he made a pretty good case for his return with a 
76.6 PFF grade along with being 3rd overall for centers in NYoA per play.54 John 
Sullivan is exactly the type of player we want our algorithm to flag for review. He played 
at an extremely high level and is not paid like it. There are concerns for sure but even if 
he returns to be average he is still severely underpaid at less than $1,000,000 per year. 
Though more than likely this is a one-year “prove it” contract with the Rams to test 
Sullivan and see if he is able to make a return to the NFL. 
Matt Slauson: 
Matt Slauson plays center for the San Diego Chargers and started all 16 games for 
them in the 2016 season. He has a two-year $3,000,000 contract with $600,000 of that 
being guaranteed. This him the 24th highest paid center in the NFL. His performance stats 
																																								 																				
52 http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/10/26/minimal-chance-john-sullivan-returns-
to-vikings-in-2015/ [24] 
53 http://www.pro-football-reference.com/players/S/SullJo24.htm [12] 
54 http://www.nflgsis.com/GameStatsLive/LegacyReports [16] 
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however have him within the top 20 for all of NYoA per play and both passing and 
rushing differentials.55 That along with his 18th rank by PFF with a grade of 81.2 placing 
him in the above average category for centers in the national football league. 
His PFF grades puts him in the neighborhood of both Maurkice Pouncy (82.4) and 
Ryan Kalil (81.2) who are paid a salary per year of $8,950,000 and $8,375,000 
respectively. Slauson also has a higher NYoA per play than Kalil. Matt Slauson has been 
a consistently quality center in the NFL and is not paid like it. 
Team by Team: 
An interesting question we could ask is about individual teams. Are their certain 
teams that look like they might over or underpay in general? Based on our previous work 
there are two ways to approach this problem. First we can just run a regression with a 
dummy variable for each team included.56 We would then want to know if any of those 
dummy variables are statistically significant and that would in theory highlight any team 
that has a significant effect on compensation. 
I ran two regressions, both control for all of our variables we previously found as 
relevant, and both include 31 total dummy variables, one for each team with the Jaguars 
omitted to ovoid problems with colinearity. I then regressed that set of independent 
variables on Log(Total Value) and AverageperYear. I highlighted any teams whose 
																																								 																				
55 https://grades.profootballfocus.com/#/ratings/positions/show/C [11] 
56 There is really a dummy for every team but one to avoid collinearity in our regressors 
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dummy variable was significant at the 99% level in both specifications, this resulted in 5 
flagged teams: 
 Log (Total Value) Average per Year 
Team Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Bears -2.65 -3.65 -4,328,248 -3.92 
Giants -2.77 -6.77 -6,633,156 -7.92 
Seahawks -2.38 -3.7 -4,469,792 -5.35 
Panthers -2.31 -4.4 -4,263,812 -5.03 
Ravens -1.81 -3.33 -5,352,036 -5.14 
 
There are a few pretty clear shortcomings of this method. First teams with fewer 
players would be more susceptible to appearing on this list. Also the coefficients are 
fairly difficult to interpret. What we can say is that being on these teams has a statistically 
significant effect on pay, how much or if teams tend to over or under pay cannot be 
inferred. There are also likely two more issues. A team that has one star that is highly 
paid, but then no one else that is significantly different is likely to get flagged. Another 
issue would be to do with the number of observations that belong to each dummy 
variable. For instance, the Seahawks have only two offensive linemen in our dataset, this 
will likely have an effect on the significance of that variable in a way we do not 
necessarily want. 
However, there might be a better way to attack this problem using our clustering 
method. We can create two new statistics that will attempt to quantify this problem using 
the methodology of our clustering. The two stats we are interested in creating are a team 
value score, and a team compensation differential. 
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In order to create the team value score we can simply sum up the value scores for 
each offensive lineman on a given team. This gives an aggregate value score for each 
team. The problem here of course being that there are different numbers of linemen on 
each team. So to account for that fact we can divide the aggregate by the number of 
offensive lineman we looked at on that team to get a team value score per player. We 
created a score with both Log (Total Value) and Average Salary per Year. The scores for 
all 32 teams can be found in Table 17 of the appendix. We can then flag every team that 
has a per player score of less than negative one or greater than one. Below are the four 
teams that were flagged on both lists: 
Team 
Log(total value)  Average Per Year  
Aggregate 
Score 
Per Player 
Score 
Aggregate 
Score 
Per Player 
Score 
Giants -3.97 -1.99 -3.09 -1.55 
Broncos 2.14 1.07 3.25 1.62 
Jaguars 2.23 1.11 2.47 1.23 
Texans 5.78 1.16 6.21 1.24 
 
A breakdown of each team’s player composition and their relevant statistics can be 
found in Table 18 of the Appendix. Based on our team value scores the Giants seem to 
consistently find value in their veteran offensive lineman. On the other hand, we have 
three teams who seem to be consistently overpaying for their veteran offensive linemen: 
The Broncos, Jaguars and Texans.  
 The Giants only have two veteran offensive linemen we looked at, John Jerry and 
Marshall Newhouse, both of whom had individual value scores of close to -2 for Log 
(total Value) and close to -1.5 for Average per Year. This is why their team score is so 
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good. There are only two observations and both were flagged by the algorithm as 
undervalued. Most other teams have several neutral to overvalued linemen to balance out 
their team score, but the Giants do not. 
 For both the Broncos and Jaguars we likely have a similar scenario to the Giants. 
Each only have two observations in the data set. For the Jaguars, Jermey Parnell was 
flagged as overvalued with a player score of 1.318. And for the Broncos, Donald 
Stephenson was flagged as overvalued with a player score of 1.293. These score coupled 
with the fact that each only had one teammate, both of which had scores of about 1, 
means these teams get flagged as poor at creating value with their veteran offensive 
linemen.  
 The team that really sticks out here is the Texans. They have 5 players, all but 1 
of whom had positive player scores meaning they all sit above their cluster means. The 
only one with a negative player score is Derek Newton with a -.02 for Log (Total Value) 
and -.04 for Average per Year, meaning that he is just about at his cluster average. They 
do however have three players all above 1.0 with their player scores: 
Name Log(Total Value) Player Score 
Average per Year 
Player Score 
Jeff Allen 1.858 2.505 
Tony Bergstrom 2.201 2.470 
Duane Brown 1.421 1.465 
 
Both Jeff Allen and Tony Bergstrom are discussed above and are likely overpaid. Duane 
Brown likely falls into the Trent Williams camp of market setters as he is considered one 
of the better tackles in the league. These three players coupled with the pair of near-
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neutral but overvalued-leaning players, Chris Clark and Derek Newton, make for the 
highest team value score in the league. It is likely that the Texans are overpaying for 
veteran offensive line talent. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Valuation of a player in any sport is difficult, but in football, referred to by many 
as the ultimate team sport, it is even more difficult. In the working world you would 
expect an employee to be paid around their marginal product in sports however that gets 
a little more difficult. An athlete ostensibly has two different marginal products. First 
they have a marginal product that is based on their performance, or the value they add to 
the team in a sport-specific sense, like their on-field output. But they also contribute to 
the overall revenue of the team, so each player would also have a marginal revenue 
product based on things like advertising, jersey sales, and many other likely 
unquantifiable means of increasing a team’s revenue. This two pronged difference in 
value already makes it difficult to assign a monetary value to an individual athlete. 
Though coupled with the fact that the NFL has a salary cap and that rookie contracts are 
heavily restricted based on the collective bargaining agreement make it near impossible. 
The market for talent in the NFL is heavily restricted and thusly is based on value relative 
to other athletes. 
 The other great trouble with valuation of NFL players is that on any given play 
there are 22 players in action with countless interactions between these players it is 
difficult to isolate one thing that makes a player valuable or not. This problem is only 
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exacerbated with the valuation of offensive lineman due to the fact that in general their 
production cannot be measured through any action of their own. 
The methodology outlined in this paper attempts to aid in this valuation process 
by using machine learning to flag potentially incorrectly valued players. While 
impossible to say if the algorithm was successful or not we can say that we have 
processed over a hundred veteran offensive lineman and distilled that list down to twenty 
players for further review. This cuts down dramatically on the resources that NFL teams 
need to scout the veteran free agent market and allows them to focus more time on the 
interesting leads. 
This methodology has applications much more broad than just to offensive 
lineman. In fact, it would likely work a lot better for other positions and likely other 
sports too. This valuation method attempts to take in metrics for past performance, 
ability, and experience across all players in a particular market and find the inefficiencies 
in pricing in regards to certain players. In a sport like football there is a lot of noise 
associated with measuring ability and performance. In baseball there is considerably less 
noise in measuring those metrics and so this methodology would likely work well in that 
market. 
This paper serves as a case study for a specific valuation method. The intent of 
this method is to better deal with the noise associated with measuring a particular player’s 
value. We have created a general algorithm for identifying inefficiencies in pricing 
athletes 
 
 
50	
	
Appendix 
Table 1 
List of All Power Five Conference Teams 
Atlantic Coast 
Conference Big Ten Big 12 Pac 12 
Southeastern 
Conference 
Boston College Baylor Illinois Arizona Alabama 
Clemson Iowa State Indiana Arizona State Arkansas 
Duke Kansas Iowa California Auburn 
Florida State Kansas State Maryland UCLA Florida 
Georgia Tech Oklahoma Michigan Colorado Georgia 
Louisville Oklahoma St. Michigan State Oregon Kentucky 
Miami TCU Minnesota Oregon State LSU 
North Carolina Texas Nebraska USC Mississippi 
N. Carolina St. Texas Tech Northwestern Stanford Mississippi St. 
Pittsburg West Virginia Ohio State Utah Missouri 
Syracuse  Penn State Washington South Carolina 
Virginia  Purdue Washington St. Tennessee 
Virginia Tech  Rutgers  Texas A&M 
Wake Forest  Wisconsin  Vanderbilt 
Notre Dame*     
*Notre Dame is independent though plays five games against ACC opponents each year 
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Table 2 
Definitions of Performance Statistics 
Variable Description 
Net Yards over Avg. (NYoA) Yards with player on field minus league average 
NYoA per Play* NYoA divided by plays with player on field 
Rushing NYoA NYoA on Rush plays 
Rushing NYoA per Rush* Rushing NYoA divided by rushes with player on field 
Avg. Rush with Player Average length of rush with player 
Avg. Rush without Player Average length of rush without player 
Rushing Differential* Avg. Rush with player minus Avg. Rush without 
Passing NYoA NYoA on Pass plays 
Passing NYoA per Pass* Passing NYoA divided by passes with player on field 
Average Pass with Player Average length of pass with player 
Average Pass Without Player Average length of pass without player 
Passing Differential* Avg. Pass with player minus Avg. Pass without 
Adjusted Line Yards (ALY)* Rush yards adjusted for player contribution 
*Statistic described thoroughly in analysis 
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Table 3 
Variable Relevance—Experience on Compensation Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log (Total Value) Average per 
Year 
Average Guarantee 
per Year 
    
Tackle 0.417* 1.359e+06*** 1.359e+06*** 
 (0.214) (487,784) (487,784) 
Gamesplayed -0.0297*** -80,593*** -80,593*** 
 (0.00897) (16,329) (16,329) 
Starts 0.0392*** 103,032*** 103,032*** 
 (0.00666) (13,054) (13,054) 
Exp -0.0465 -112,764 -112,764 
 (0.0656) (152,986) (152,986) 
PowerFive 0.114 876,808** 876,808** 
 (0.225) (440,893) (440,893) 
Constant 15.99*** 4.155e+06*** 4.155e+06*** 
 (0.476) (1.000e+06) (1.000e+06) 
    
Observations 116 116 116 
R-squared 0.334 0.430 0.430 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 
Variable Relevance—Experience and Accolades Percent Guarantee Regressions 
 
Experience Percent Guarantee  Accolades 
Percent 
Guarantee 
Tackle 
0.0495 
 Tackle 
0.0599* 
(0.0367) (0.0339) 
Gamesplayed 
-0.00139 
 PowerFive 
0.0657** 
(0.00115) (0.0329) 
Starts 
0.00218** 
 ProBowl 
0.0654*** 
(0.000935) (0.0175) 
Exp 
-0.00378 
 AllPro 
-0.0876*** 
(0.0149) (0.0237) 
PowerFive 
0.0558 
 SBChamp 
0.113*** 
(0.0344) (0.0412) 
Constant 
0.247*** 
 Constant 
0.205*** 
(0.0877) (0.0308) 
     
Observations 116  Observations 116 
R-squared 0.100  R-squared 0.179 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 
Variable Relevance—Performance and Athleticism Percent Guarantee Regressions 
Performance Percent Guarantee  Athleticism 
Percent 
Guarantee 
Tackle 0.0549  Tackle 0.0145 
(0.	0365) (0.0409) 
NYoA per Play 
0.0904 
 Height 
0.0302** 
(0.0789) (0.0128) 
RushingNYoAperRush 
-0.0928 
 Weight 
-0.000178 
(0.0611) (0.00151) 
RushingDifferential 
0.0790* 
 FortyYd 
0.00306 
(0.0417) (0.0210) 
PassingNYoAperPass 
-0.0629 
 TwentySS 
-0.0116 
(0.0439) (0.0327) 
PassingDifferential 
0.0389 
 ThreeCone 
0.0141** 
(0.0439) (0.00619) 
ALY_Adj 
(0.0070) 
 Vertical 
-0.000218 
(0.0207) (0.000205) 
Constant 
0.2719*** 
 Broad 
-0.000840 
(0.0687) (0.00147) 
   Bench 0.00348**  
(0.00168) 
   Constant 
-2.004* 
(1.076) 
     
Observations 116  Observations 116 
R-squared   R-squared 0.132 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 
Athleticism Variables on Compensation Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log (Total Value) Average per 
Year 
Average Guarantee 
per Year 
    
tackle 0.706** 1.944e+06** 411,908 
 (0.294) (761,024) (355,442) 
ht -0.0275 42,344 228,896* 
 (0.103) (239,066) (137,628) 
wt 0.00402 -2,250 -3,976 
 (0.0107) (25,005) (11,849) 
fortyyd -0.0873 -40,981 94,878 
 (0.124) (348,776) (160,612) 
twentyss -0.117 -326,408 -219,001 
 (0.181) (401,562) (213,315) 
threecone 0.0943** 257,631*** 137,573*** 
 (0.0418) (91,871) (47,209) 
vertical 0.00194 -3,009 -2,713 
 (0.00163) (3,793) (1,974) 
broad -0.000601 1,203 -2,321 
 (0.00599) (11,899) (7,741) 
bench 0.0176 53,987 33,010** 
 (0.0145) (34,633) (15,065) 
Constant 16.69* 384,958 -1.560e+07 
 (8.739) (1.934e+07) (1.065e+07) 
    
Observations 116 116 116 
R-squared 0.102 0.143 0.159 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 
Accolade Variables on Compensation Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log (Total Value) Average per 
Year 
Average Guarantee 
per Year 
    
tackle 0.478** 1.488e+06*** 639,717** 
 (0.230) (516,839) (257,659) 
power_five 0.200 1.039e+06** 808,114*** 
 (0.239) (469,546) (234,043) 
pro_bowl 0.375*** 1.013e+06*** 663,100*** 
 (0.118) (307,743) (159,561) 
all_pro -0.136 -184,547 -604,035** 
 (0.157) (426,674) (231,646) 
sb_champ 0.485** 1.068e+06** 1.045e+06** 
 (0.194) (525,380) (495,569) 
Constant 15.40*** 2.444e+06*** 393,969* 
 (0.238) (446,555) (231,924) 
    
Observations 116 116 116 
R-squared 0.239 0.391 0.330 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 
Performance Variables on Compensation Regression Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log (Total Value) Average per 
Year 
Average Guarantee 
per Year 
    
tackle 0.712*** 2.116e+06*** 801,104** 
 (0.239) (609,545) (318,214) 
nyoaperplay 1.288*** 2.847e+06** 1.324e+06** 
 (0.457) (1.168e+06) (653,664) 
rushingnyoaperrush -0.199 164,455 -335,020 
 (0.346) (786,805) (432,113) 
rushingdifferential 0.250 -57,940 195,175 
 (0.275) (671,512) (321,986) 
passingnyoaperpass -0.909*** -1.936e+06*** -709,000* 
 (0.265) (650,688) (361,102) 
passingdifferential 0.253 653,047 248,349 
 (0.279) (570,391) (327,439) 
aly_adj 0.318** 621,108* 105,091 
 (0.140) (319,439) (161,566) 
Constant 14.90*** 2.180e+06** 1.105e+06** 
 (0.457) (1.032e+06) (539,293) 
    
Observations 116 116 116 
R-squared 0.228 0.215 0.106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 
Full list of Cluster Assignments 
Name Cluster Name Cluster Name Cluster 
A.Q. Shipley 7 Evan Smith 1 Matt Kalil 8 
Alex Boone 6 Garrett Reynolds 4 Matt Slauson 2 
Alex Mack 2 Geoff Schwartz 7 Maurkice Pouncey 6 
Allen Barbre 7 Gino Gradkowski 4 Max Unger 6 
Amini Silatolu 3 Gosder Cherilus 2 Michael Oher 2 
Andre Smith 6 Gradley Sowell 4 Mike Harris 4 
Andrew Gardner 3 J.R. Sweezy 8 Mike Iupati 6 
Andrew Whitworth 5 Jah Reid 4 Mike Pouncey 6 
Andy Levitre 2 James Carpenter 8 Mitchell Schwartz 6 
Anthony Castonzo 6 Jared Veldheer 6 Nate Solder 6 
Austin Howard 8 Jason Kelce 6 Nick Mangolf 5 
Ben Jones 8 Jason Peters 5 Orlando Franklin 6 
Bobby Massie 8 Jeff Allen 4 Person Person 3 
Branden Albert 2 Jeremy Zuttah 2 Phil Loadholt 6 
Brandon Brooks 8 Jermey Parnell 7 Ramon Foster 2 
Brandon Fusco 8 Jermon Bushrod 2 Richie Incognito 2 
Breno Giacomini 8 J'Marcus Webb 8 Riley Reiff 8 
Bryan Bulaga 6 Joe Barksdale 8 Rodger Saffold 6 
Byron Bell 8 Joe Berger 1 Rodney Hudson 8 
Chis Clark 7 Joe Hawley 7 Russell Okung 6 
Chris Chester 5 Joe Looney 3 Ryan Clady 2 
Chris Hairston 7 Joe Reitz 7 Ryan Harris 1 
Chris Scott 3 Joe Staley 5 Ryan Kalil 2 
Clint Boling 6 Joe Thomas 5 Sam Young 4 
Cordy Glenn 8 John Greco 1 Sebastian Vollmer 6 
Daniel Kilgore 4 John Jerry 6 Shawn Lauvao 6 
David DeCastro 8 John Sullivan 2 Stefen Wisniewski 6 
Demar Dotson 1 Josh LeRibeus 3 Ted Larsen 1 
Dennis Kelly 4 Josh Sitton 2 Tim Barnes 7 
Derek Newton 8 Kelechi Osemele 8 TJ Lang 2 
Don Barclay 4 Kelvin Beachum 8 Tony Bergstrom 3 
Donald Penn 5 Kevin Zeitler 8 Trent Williams 6 
Donald Stephenson 4 King Dunlap 1 Trevor Robinson 3 
Doug Free 2 Kory Lichtensteiger 6 Tyron Smith 6 
Duane Brown 2 Kraig Urbik 1 Vladimir Ducasse 7 
Eric Winston 2 Marcus Cannon 7 Zach Strief 2 
Eric Wood 6 Marcus Gilbert 8 Zane Beadles 2 
Erik Pears 2 Marshal Yanda 5   
Evan Mathis 2 Marshall Newhouse 8   
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Table 10 
Clustering Output—Players Flagged Overvalued  
  log(total Val) Avg/ year Avg Guar/ year 
Name Cluster Value (Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Branden Albert 2 17.67 
(1.312) 
9,400,000 
(1.648) 
4,000,000 
(1.500) 
Jeff Allen 4 17.15 
(1.858) 
7,000,000 
(2.505) 
3,000,000 
(2.512) 
Tony Bergstrom 3 15.56 
(2.201) 
2,875,000 
(2.470) 
750,000 
(2.466) 
Duane  Brown 2 17.79 
(1.421) 
8,900,000 
(1.465) 
3,680,250 
(1.281) 
Marcus Cannon 7 17.30 
(1.331) 
6,500,000 
(1.475) 
2,470,000 
(1.177) 
King Dunlap 1 17.15 
(1.441) 
7,000,000 
(1.862) 
2,125,000 
(1.931342) 
Cordy Glenn 8 17.91 
(1.227) 
12,000,000 
(2.033) 
5,300,000 
(2.142) 
Alex Mack 2 17.62 
(1.274) 
9,000,000 
(1.502) 
4,000,000 
(1.500) 
Kelechi Osemele 8 17.90 
(1.199) 
11,700,000 
(1.934) 
5,080,000 
(1.989) 
Jermey Parnell 7 17.28 
(1.318) 
6,400,000 
(1.432) 
2,900,000 
(1.579) 
Geoff Schwartz 7 17.31 
(1.343) 
6,600,000 
(1.518) 
2,532,000 
(1.235) 
Donald 
Stephenson 4 
16.45 
(1.293) 
4,666,667 
(1.302) 
2,000,000 
(1.425) 
Trent Williams 6 18.01 
(1.067) 
13,200,000 
(2.0767) 
6,000,000 
(1.743) 
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Table 11 
Clustering Output—Players Flagged Undervalued  
  log(total Val) Avg/ year Avg Guar/ year 
Name Cluster Value (Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Byron Bell 8 14.63 
(-2.399) 
2,250,000 
(-1.201) 
650,000 
(-1.105) 
Chris Chester 5 14.67 
(-1.917) 
2,350,000 
(-1.969) 
250,000 
(-1.619) 
Vladimir Ducasse 7 13.54 
(-1.669) 
760,000 
(-1.014) 
0 
(-1.132) 
Marshall Newhouse 8 14.91 
(-2.081) 
1,500,000 
(-1.450) 
500,000 
(-1.210) 
Matt Slauson 2 14.91 
(-1.053) 
1,500,000 
(-1.236) 
300,000 
(-1.030) 
John Sullivan 2 13.69 
(-2.102) 
885,000 
(-1.461) 
0 
(-1.235) 
Eric Winston 2 13.90 
(-1.923) 
1,090,000 
(-1.386) 
80,000 
(-1.180) 
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Table 12 
Positional Salary Differences—Tackle vs Guard and Center 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log(Total Value) Average per Year Average Guarantee 
per Year 
Tackle 
0.391* 
(0.218) 
1.244e+06** 
(484,175) 
603,119** 
(281,612) 
Race_Bin 
0.242 
(0.224) 
923,229** 
(461,747) 
87,568 
(273,960) 
GamesPlayed 
-0.0323*** 
(0.00769) 
-83,171*** 
(15,465) 
-36,464*** 
(9,105) 
Starts 
0.0315*** 
(0.00714) 
74,770*** 
(13,742) 
32,116*** 
(8,256) 
Power_Five 
0.118 
(0.232) 
807,927* 
(436,356) 
732,254*** 
(240,603) 
NYoA per Play 
-0.00620 
(0.166) 
320,838 
(327,574) 
71,071 
(206,881) 
ALY_Adj 
0.0890 
(0.131) 
98,274 
(241,205) 
-111,672 
(148,289) 
RushingDifferential 
 
0.614*** 
(0.191) 
1.053e+06*** 
(337,620) 
343,962 
(209,826) 
PassingDifferential 
-0.159 
(0.166) 
-320,268 
(275,121) 
81,182 
(177,853) 
Pro_Bowl 
0.173 
(0.116) 
610,554** 
(260,359) 
533,205*** 
(171,007) 
All_Pro 
0.00940 
(0.139) 
153,225 
(323,471) 
-502,119** 
(224,755) 
SB_Champ 
0.370* 
(0.205) 
901,743* 
(501,427) 
1.052e+06** 
(483,764) 
Constant 
15.91*** 
(0.572) 
4.345e+06*** 
(946,603) 
1.790e+06*** 
(562,443) 
    
    
Observations 116 116 116 
R-squared 0.460 0.601 0.444 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13 
Clustering by Position—Full List of Tackle Clusters 
Name Cluster Name Cluster 
Andre Smith 4 Jason Peters 1 
Andrew Whitworth 1 Jermy Parnell 5 
Anthony Castonzo 4 J'Marcus Webb 2 
Austin Howard 5 Joe Barksdale 2 
Bobby Massie 2 Joe Reitz 5 
Bradley Sowell 3 Joe Staley 1 
Branden Albert 1 Joe Thomas 1 
Breno Giacomini 2 Kelvin Beachum 2 
Bryan Bulaga 2 King Dunlap 4 
Byron Bell 2 Marcus Cannon 5 
Chris Clark 3 Marcus Gilbert 2 
Chris Hairston 5 Marshall Newhouse 2 
Cordy Glenn 2 Matt Kalil 2 
Demar Dotson 4 Michael Oher 4 
Dennis Kelly 3 Mitchell Schwartz 4 
Derek Newton 2 Nate Solder 4 
Donald Penn 1 Phil Loadholt 4 
Donald Stephenson 3 Riley Reiff 2 
Doug Free 1 Russell Okung 4 
Duane Brown 1 Ryan Clady 4 
Eric Winston 1 Ryan Harris 4 
Erik Pears 4 Sam Young 3 
Garrett Reynolds 3 Sebastian Vollmer 4 
Gosder Cherilus 1 Trent Williams 4 
Jah Reid 3 Tyron Smith 4 
Jared Veldheer 4 Zach Strief 1 
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Table 14 
Clustering by Position—Cluster Frequencies 
 
 
Tackles  Guards and Centers 
Cluster Freq.  Cluster Freq. 
1 11  1 7 
2 13  2 9 
3 7  3 10 
4 16  4 15 
5 5  5 9 
   6 14 
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Table 15 
Clustering Result—Tackles Flagged Over and Undervalued 
Overvalued  log(total Val) Avg/ year Avg Guar/ year 
Name Cluster 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Cordy Glenn 2 17.91 (1.330) 
12,000,000 
(2.299) 
5,300,000 
(2.145) 
Donald Stephenson 3 16.45 (1.356) 
4,666,667 
(1.645) 
2,000,000 
(1.558) 
Trent Williams 4 18.01 (1.198) 
13,200,000 
(1.592) 
6,000,000 
(1.217) 
Kelvin Beachum 2 17.62 (1.045) 
9,000,000 
(1.269) 
300,000 
(-1.118) 
Tyron Smith 4 18.40 (1.575) 
12,200,000 
(1.320) - 
Joe Thoms 1 18.20 (1.194) 
11,500,000 
(1.448) - 
Russell Okung 4 - 13,250,000 (1.605) 
6,125,000 
(1.266) 
     
 
Undervalued  log(total Val) Avg/ year Avg Guar/ year 
Name 
Cluster Value (Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Chris Hairston 
5 14.88 (-1.500) 
1,450,000 
(-1.330) 
275,000 
(-1.315) 
Eric Winston 
1 13.90 (-2.261) 
1,090,000 
(-1.763) 
80,000 
(-1.474) 
Byron Bell 
2 14.63 (-1.925) 
2,250,000 
(-1.047) - 
Ryan Harris 
4 15.18 (-1.527) 
1,950,000 
(-1.468) - 
Marshall Newhouse 
2 14.91 (-1.640) 
1,500,000 
(-1.305) - 
Erik Pears 
4 15.56 (-1.161) 
2,850,000 
(-1.305) - 
Andre Smith 
4 15.07 (-1.631) 
3,500,000 
(-1.0467) - 
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Table 16 
Clustering Results—Guards and Centers Flagged Over and Undervalued 
     
Overvalued  log(total Val) Avg/ year Avg Guar/ year 
Name Cluster 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Jeff Allen 
6 17.15 (2.483) 
7,000,000 
(3.220) 
3,000,000 
(3.284) 
Kelechi Osemele 
5 17.88 (1.142) 
11,700,000 
(1.576) 
5,080,000 
(1.952) 
Geoff Schwartz 
1 17.31 (1.544) 
6,600,000 
(1.974) 
2,532,000 
(1.813) 
T.J. Lang 
2 16.85 (1.548) 
5,200,000 
(1.846) - 
Tony Bergstrom 
6 15.56 (1.007) - - 
 
Undervalued  log(total Val) Avg/ year Avg Guar/ year 
Name 
Cluster Value (Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Value 
(Score) 
Chris Chester 
3 14.67 (-1.514) 
2,350,000 
(-1.288) 
250,000 
(-1.405) 
Ted Larsen 
4 14.32 (-1.955) 
1,650,000 
(-1.512) 
350,000 
(-1.335) 
John Sullivan 
2 13.69 (-1.795) 
885,000 
(-1.332) 
0 
(-1.035) 
Kraig Urbik 
4 14.73 (-1.605) 
1,250,000 
(-1.667) 
125,000 
(-1.543) 
Stefen Wisniewski 
4 14.23 (-2.029) 
1,510,000 
(-1.566) 
500,000 
(-1.197) 
Jermon Bushrod 
3 14.22 (-1.892) 
1,500,000 
(-1.605) - 
Kevin Zeitler 
5 15.84 (-2.023) 
1,886,050 
(-1.565) - 
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Table 17 
Team Value Scores 
 Team Score by Log(Total Value) Team Score by Average per Year 
Team Aggregate per Player Aggregate Per Player 
49ers 0.571 0.143 -1.608 -0.402 
Bears -3.498 -0.875 -1.964 -0.491 
Bengals -3.610 -0.902 -2.771 -0.693 
Bills 1.723 0.574 1.976 0.659 
Broncos 2.144 1.072 3.248 1.624 
Browns 1.384 0.692 0.872 0.436 
Buccaneers 1.334 0.267 0.214 0.043 
Cardinals -0.861 -0.215 -0.948 -0.237 
Chargers -0.249 -0.041 -0.485 -0.081 
Chiefs 1.419 0.709 0.536 0.268 
Colts 0.874 0.437 1.048 0.524 
Cowboys 2.230 0.743 1.353 0.451 
Dolphins -1.263 -0.253 -0.428 -0.086 
Eagles -2.790 -0.399 -2.257 -0.322 
Falcons -0.614 -0.154 -0.545 -0.136 
Giants -3.971 -1.986 -3.095 -1.547 
Jaguars 2.228 1.114 2.470 1.235 
Jets 1.003 0.251 0.331 0.083 
Lions 0.344 0.172 0.234 0.117 
Packers 0.490 0.122 0.077 0.019 
Panthers 0.612 0.153 1.250 0.312 
Patriots 0.936 0.312 1.565 0.522 
Raiders 2.023 0.506 2.340 0.585 
Rams -0.698 -0.233 -0.990 -0.330 
Ravens 0.223 0.111 -0.551 -0.276 
Redskins 0.902 0.226 -0.367 -0.092 
Saints 0.571 0.285 -0.183 -0.092 
Seahawks -2.125 -1.063 -1.499 -0.749 
Steelers 1.820 0.303 0.266 0.044 
Texans 5.784 1.157 6.209 1.242 
Titans 2.533 1.266 -1.697 -0.849 
Vikings -6.402 -0.800 -4.602 -0.575 
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Table 18 
Player Scores by Team—For Those Teams with Flagged Team Scores 
Team Name Log (Total Value) Player 
Score 
Average per Year 
Player Score 
Giants John Jerry -1.890 -1.645 
Giants Marshall Newhouse -2.081 -1.450 
Broncos Russel Okung 0.851 1.946 
Broncos Donald Stephenson 1.293 1.302 
Jaguars Kelvin Beachum 0.909 1.038 
Jaguars Jermey Parnell 1.318 1.432 
Texans Jeff Allen 1.858 2.505 
Texans Tony Bergstrom 2.201 2.470 
Texans Duane Brown 1.421 1.465 
Texans Chris Clark -0.019 -0.042 
Texans Derek Newton 0.324 -0.189 
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